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Abstract
Network neutrality and the role of regulation on the Internet have been heavily debated in recent times. Amongst
the various definitions of network neutrality, we focus on the one which prohibits paid prioritization of content
and we present an analytical treatment of the topic. We develop a model of the Internet ecosystem in terms of
three primary players: consumers, ISPs and content providers. Our analysis looks at this issue from the point of
view of the consumer, and we describe the desired state of the system as one which maximizes consumer surplus.
By analyzing different scenarios of monopoly and competition, we obtain different conclusions on the desirability
of regulation. We also introduce the notion of a Public Option ISP, an ISP that carries traffic in a network neutral
manner. Our major findings are (i) in a monopolistic scenario, network neutral regulations benefit consumers;
however, the introduction of a Public Option ISP is even better for consumers, as it aligns the interests of the
monopolistic ISP with the consumer surplus and (ii) in an oligopolistic situation, the presence of a Public Option
ISP is again preferable to network neutral regulations, although the presence of competing price-discriminating
ISPs provides the most desirable situation for the consumers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since around 2005, network neutrality has been a hotly debated topic amongst law and policy makers.
The core debate has centered around the argument whether ISPs should be allowed to provide service
differentiation and/or user discrimination, with the notion of “user” being either content providers (CPs)
or consumers. Proponents of network neutrality, mostly the CPs, have argued that the Internet has been
“neutral” since its inception and that has been a critical factor in the innovation and rapid growth that
has happened on it. Opponents of network neutrality, mostly the ISPs, claim that without some sort of
service differentiation, ISPs will lose the incentive to invest in the networks and the end user experience
will suffer. Both camps implicitly or explicitly claim that their approach is beneficial for consumers. A
recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) vote [1] in the US has sided with the proponents,
although the ruling leaves some room for service differentiation in wireless networks. The controvesy
rages on though with corporations like Verizon filing lawsuits challenging the ruling and a “toll-tax”
dispute between Level3/Netflix and Comcast being cast as a network neutrality issue.
We study the issue explicitly from the point of view of the consumer under both monopolistic and
oligopolistic scenarios. A lot of arguments against network neutrality live in an idealized world where
economies of scale do not exist and monopolies cannot emerge, and therefore perfect competition solves
all problems. We believe reality is more nuanced and hence we examine monopolistic scenarios as well.
Our approach to the analysis is a game theoretic one, and we focus on the consumer surplus. We model
the rate allocation mechanism of the system and the user demand for different CPs. The interplay between
the two determines the rate equilibrium for all traffic flows. Our model of price discrimination is for the
ISPs to offer two classes of service to CPs. The ISP divides its capacity into a premium and ordinary
class, and CPs get charged for carrying traffic in the premium class, and more details are presented in
Section III-A. We then identify and analyze the strategic games played between ISPs, CPs and consumers
in Section III for a monopolistic scenario and in Section IV for oligopolistic scenarios. In Section IV-A,
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we introduce the notion of a Public Option ISP which is neutral to all CPs. The Public Option ISP can be
implemented by processes like local loop unbundling [3] in a monopolistic market and either government
or a private organization can run the ISP and still be profitable [12]. Given the framework, our major
findings are:
• The impact of network neutrality on consumer surplus depends on the nature of competition at the ISP
level. Concretely, a neutral network is beneficial for consumer surplus under a monopolistic regime
(Section III), whereas a non-neutral network is advantageous for consumers under an oligopolistic
scenario (Section IV).
• The capacity of the network plays a big role on the regulations for consumer surplus. Price dis-
crimination in a monopolistic network where capacity is plentiful can have a damaging effect on
consumer surplus, whereas it might gain higher utility for the consumer in a network where capacity
is extremely scarce (Section III).
• Introducing a Public Option ISP is advantageous for consumers. In a monopolistic situation, the
Public Option ISP offers the best scenario for consumers (Theorem 5), followed by network neutral
regulations, and an unregulated market being the worst.
• In an oligopolistic situation, the Public Option ISP is still preferable to network neutral regulations;
however, since the incentive for an ISP to gain market share is aligned with the maximization of
consumer surplus (Theorem 6), no regulation is needed to protect the consumers.
• Under an oligopolistic competition, any ISP’s optimal pricing and service differentiation strategy,
whether network neutral or not, will be close the one that maximizes consumer surplus (Theorem
6 and Corollary 1). Moreover, under a probable equilibrium where ISPs use homogenous strategies,
their market shares will be proportional to their capacities (Lemma 4), which implies that ISPs do
have incentives to invest and expand capacity so as to their increase market shares.
Our paper sheds new light on the network neutrality debate and concretely identifies where and how
regulation can help. Additionally, our identification of the Public Option ISP is especially important as it
provides a solution that combines the best of both worlds, protecting consumer interests without enforcing
strict regulations on all ISPs. We start with describing our model in the next section.
II. THREE-PARTY ECOSYSTEM MODEL
We consider a model of the Internet with three parties: 1) CPs, 2) ISPs and 3) consumers. We focus
on a fixed consumer group in a targeted geographic region. We denote M as the number of consumers in
the region1. Each consumer subscribes to an Internet access service via an ISP. We consider the scenarios
where one monopolistic ISP I or a set I of competing oligopolistic ISPs provide the Internet access for
the consumers. We denote N as the set of CPs from which the consumers request content. We define
N = |N | as the number of CPs. Our model does not include the backbone ISPs for two reasons. First,
the bottleneck of the Internet is often at the last-mile connection towards the consumers [10], both wired
and wireless. We focus on the regional or so-called eyeball ISPs [14] that provide the bottleneck last-mile
towards the consumers. Second, the recent concern on network neutrality manifests itself in the cases
where the last-mile ISPs, e.g. France Telecom, Telecom Italia and Vodafone, intended to differentiate
services and charge CPs, e.g. Apple and Google, for service fees [5].
We denote µ as the last-mile bottleneck capacity towards the consumers in the region. Figure 1 depicts
the contention at the bottleneck among different flows from the CPs. We denote λi as the aggregate
throughput rate from CP i to the consumers. Because consumers initiate downloads and retrieve content
from the CPs, we first model the consumer demands so as to characterize the CPs’ throughput rates λis.
1Note that M can also be interpreted as the average or peak number of consumers accessing the Internet simultaneously in the region,
which will scale with the total number of actual consumers in a region. This does not change the nature of any of the results we describe
subsequently, but gives a more realistic interpretation of the rate equilibrium.
Fig. 1. Contention at the last-mile bottleneck link.
Given a set N of CPs, a group of M consumers and a link with capacity µ, we denote the system as a
triple (M,µ,N ).
A. Throughput Demand
We denote θˆi as the unconstrained throughput for a typical user of CP i. For instance, the unconstrained
throughput for the highest quality Netflix streaming movie is about 5 Mbps [4], and given an average query
page of 20 KB and an average query response time of .25 seconds [2], the unconstrained throughput for a
Google search is about 600 Kbps, or just over 1/10th of Netflix. We denote αi ∈ (0, 1] as the percentage
of consumers that ever access CP i’s content, which models the popularity of the content of CP i. We
define λˆi = αiMθˆi as the unconstrained throughput of CP i. Without contention, CP i’s throughput λi
equals λˆi. However, when the capacity µ cannot support the unconstrained throughput from all CPs, i.e.
µ <
∑
i∈N λˆi, two things will happen: 1) a typical user of CP i obtains throughput θi < θˆi from CP i, and
2) some active users might stop downloading content from CP i when θi goes below certain threshold,
e.g. users of real-time content like Netflix. We denote θi as the achievable throughput for the consumers
downloading content from CP i. We define a demand function di(θi) which represents the percentage of
consumers that still demand content from CP i under the achievable throughput θi.
Assumption 1: For any CP i, the demand di(·) is a non-negative, continuous and non-decreasing function
defined on the domain of [0, θˆi], and satisfies di(θˆi) = 1.
We define the aggregate throughput as λN =
∑
i∈N λi, where each CP i’s throughput λi is defined as
follows:
λi(θi) = αiMdi(θi)θi. (1)
B. Rate Allocation Mechanism
When multiple flows share the same bottleneck link, they compete for capacity. The rates allocated to
the flows depend on the rate allocation mechanism being use in the system.
Definition 1: A rate allocation mechanism is a function that maps any fixed demand profile {di : i ∈ N}2
to an achievable throughput profile {θi : i ∈ N}.
A rate allocation mechanism can be a flow control mechanism, e.g. CBR and VBR mechanisms,
under which the bottleneck link decides the rates for each flow in a centralized manner, or a window-
based end-to-end congestion control mechanism, e.g. TCP, under which each flow maintains a sliding
window and adapts the its size based on implicit feedback from the network, e.g. the round-trip delay.
We consider generic rate allocation mechanisms and assume that the resulting rate allocation obeys the
physical constraints of the system and satisfies some desirable properties.
Axiom 1: θi ≤ θˆi for all i ∈ N .
Axiom 2: λN = min
{
µ,
∑
i∈N λˆi
}
.
The above axioms characterize the feasibility of an allocation: the aggregate rate cannot exceed the
capacity and the individual rate would not exceed its unconstrained throughput. It also characterizes a
2Without a bracket, we use di as a fixed demand.
work-conserving property: if congestion can be alleviated without increasing capacity µ, the allocation
would do so by fully utilizing the capacity.
Axiom 3 (Monotonicity): A rate allocation is monotonic if for any M > 0 and capacity µ1 < µ2, the
achievable throughput θi for any i ∈ N satisfies
θi(M,µ2,N ) ≥ θi(M,µ1,N ).
The Monotonicity axiom implies that if a flow gets an achievable throughput in one system, it will be
allocated at least that amount of throughput under a less congested system.
Axiom 4 (Independence of Scale): A rate allocation is independent of scale if for any ξ > 0, the
achievable throughput θi for any i ∈ N satisfies
θi(M,µ,N ) = θi(ξM, ξµ,N ).
The Independence of Scale axiom states that if the capacity scales at the same rate as the consumer size,
each flow’s achievable throughput θi remains the same.
Assumption 2: The network system implements a rate allocation mechanism that satisfies Axiom 1 to
4.
C. Rate Equilibrium
The demand functions map the achievable throughput to a level of demand; the rate allocation mecha-
nisms map fixed demands to achievable throughput. The interplay between a rate allocation mechanism
and the demand functions determines the system rate equilibrium as the following theorem.
Theorem 1: A system (M,µ,N ) has a unique rate equilibrium {θi : i ∈ N} under Assumption 1 and
Axiom 1 to 3.
Proof of Theorem 1: Based on Assumption 1, we know that for any i ∈ N , the throughput λi(θi)
is a non-decreasing and continuous function. By Axiom 1, λi(θi) has a range of [0, λˆi]. We show the
uniqueness of the rate equilibrium by the following two cases.
We first consider the case where µ ≥∑i∈N λˆi. By Axiom 2, λN = ∑i∈N λi(θi) = ∑i∈N λˆi. Because
λi ≤ λˆi for all i ∈ N , we must have λi = λˆi. Therefore, the unique rate equilibrium must be {θi = θˆi :
i ∈ N}.
We then consider the case where µ <
∑
i∈N λˆi. By Axiom 2, λN =
∑
i∈N λi(θi) = µ. Because
each λi(θi) is non-decreasing in θi and continuous in the range of [0, λˆi], we can always find a solution
{θi : i ∈ N} that satisfies
∑
i∈N λi(θi) = µ. Suppose there exists two equilibrium solutions {θ1i : i ∈ N}
and {θ2i : i ∈ N}. For any ε > 0, we denote {θ3i : i ∈ N} as a rate equilibrium of the system (M,µ−ε,N ).
By Axiom 2,
∑
i∈N λi(θ
3
i ) = µ− ε. By Axiom 3, θ3i ≤ min{θ1i , θ2i } for all i ∈ N . Thus, we have
µ− ε =
∑
i∈N
λi(θ
3
i ) ≤
∑
i∈N
λi(min{θ1i , θ2i })
=
∑
i∈N
min{λi(θ1i ), λi(θ2i )} < µ.
However, the above inequality would be violated when ε approaches zero. By showing this contradiction,
we prove the uniqueness of the rate equilibrium under µ <
∑
i∈N λˆi.
We define ν = µ/M as the per capita capacity of the system. By Axiom 4, we further characterize the
rate equilibrium {θi : i ∈ N} as follows.
Lemma 1: Under Assumption 1 and 2, for all i ∈ N , θi in equilibrium can be expressed as θi(M,µ,N ) =
θi(ν,N ), which is a non-decreasing and continuous function in ν.
Proof of Lemma 1: By Axiom 4, θi(M1, µ1,N ) equals θi(M2, µ2,N ) if M1/µ1 = M2/µ2. Therefore,
we can denote θi(ν,N ) = θi(M,µ,N ) for all systems (M,µ,N ) with ν = M/µ. Given any two systems
(M1, µ1,N ) and (M2, µ2,N ) with ν1 ≤ ν2, we first show that θi(ν1,N ) ≤ θi(ν2,N ) for all i ∈ N .
Suppose there exists i ∈ N such that θi(ν1,N ) > θi(ν2,N ). By Axiom 4, we have
θi(M1, µ1,N ) = θi(ν1,N )
> θi(ν2,N ) = θi(M2, µ2,N ) = θi(M1, M1
M2
µ2,N ).
Because M1
M2
µ2 > µ1, the above inequality violates Axiom 3. By showing this contradiction, we show that
θi(ν,N ) is a non-decreasing function of ν. As a result, if θi(ν,N ) is not continuous, then it can only
have upward jumps. Therefore, λN =
∑
i∈N λi(θi) will only have upward jumps as well. However, by
Axiom 2, λN has to meet the equality constraint λN = min
{
µ,
∑
i∈N λˆi
}
, which implies that when ν
increases from zero, λN cannot have jumps. Therefore, each θi has to be continuous in ν.
Lemma 1 states that when ν increases, users’ achievable throughput θi would not worse off for any CP
i.
We denote φi ≥ 0 as the per unit traffic utility that the consumers obtain by receiving content from
CP i. This utility can be derived from communicating with friends, e.g. Skype, watching movies, e.g.
Netflix, obtaining information, e.g. Google, RapidShare, and etc. Our model does not assume any form
of this utility. We denote CS as the consumer surplus defined as CS =
∑
i∈N φiλi and denote Φ as the
per capita consumer surplus defined as
Φ =
CS
M
=
1
M
∑
i∈N
φiλi(θi) =
∑
i∈N
φiαidi(θi)θi. (2)
Theorem 2: Under Assumption 1 and 2, the per capita consumer surplus Φ can be expressed as Φ(M,µ,N ) =
Φ(ν,N ), which is non-decreasing function in ν. In particular, it strictly increases in ν ∈ [0,∑i∈N αiθˆi].
Theorem 2 states that the per capita consumer surplus will strictly increase with the system per capita
capacity ν, unless it is already maximized when unconstrained throughput is obtained. This result does
not depend on the values of φis.
Proof of Theorem 2: If we define Φi = φiαidi(θi)θi for all i ∈ N , by definition Φ =
∑
i∈N Φi. Since θi is
a function of ν by Lemma 1, Φi and Φ are functions of ν as well. By Assumption 1, Φi is a non-decreasing
function of θi. By Lemma 1, θi is non-decreasing in ν; therefore, Φi and then Φ are non-decreasing in
ν. By Axiom 2, λN = µ when ν ∈ [0,
∑
i∈N αiθˆi], which implies that when ν increases, there must exist
some i ∈ N with θi strictly increasing. As a result, Φi and Φ have to be strictly increasing as well.
D. Examples and Illustrations
In this subsection, we illustrate some examples of demand functions and rate allocation mechanisms.
1) Demand as a function of throughput sensitivity: Distinct CPs often have different demand patterns.
For example, the demand for real-time applications decreases dramatically when its throughput drops
below certain threshold where performance cannot be tolerated by most of users. We can characterize this
throughput sensitivity of the CPs by a positive parameter βi and consider the demand function
di(θi) = e
−βi
(
θˆi
θi
−1
)
= e
−βi
(
1
ωi
−1
)
, (3)
where we define ωi = θi/θˆi as the percentage of unconstrained throughput achieved for CP i. The user
demand decays exponentially with the level of congestion (measured by θˆi−θi
θi
, the ratio of unsatisfied
and achieved throughput) scaled by βi. This demand function distinguishes the CPs via their throughput
sensitivity βi: larger βi indicates higher sensitivity to throughput for CP i. Figure 2 illustrates the demand
functions with various values of βi. To normalize θˆi, we plot di against ωi instead of θi. We observe that
Fig. 2. Demand function di(ωi).
when throughput drops linearly, the demand drops sharply for large βi, e.g. when βi = 5, the demand is
halved with a 10% drop in throughput from θˆi. Large βis can be used to model CPs that have stringent
throughput requirements, e.g. Netflix; while, small βis can be used to model CPs that are less sensitive
to throughput, e.g. a Google search query.
2) End-to-end congestion control mechanisms: Due to the end-to-end design principle of the Internet
[9], congestion control has been implemented by window-based protocols, i.e. TCP and its variations. Mo
and Walrand [19] showed that a class of α-proportional fair solutions3 can be implemented by window-
based end-to-end protocols. Among the class of α-proportional fair solutions, the max-min fair allocation,
a special case with α =∞, is the result of the AIMD mechanism of TCP [7]. Differing round trip times,
receiver window sizes and loss rates can result in different bandwidths, but to a first approximation, TCP
provides a max-min fair allocation of available bandwidth amongst flows. Although other protocols, e.g.
UDP, coexist in the Internet, recent research [16] sees a growing concentration of application traffic,
especially video, over TCP.
We illustrate the rate allocation under the max-min fair mechanism using an example of three CPs
with demand functions of Equation (3) and parameters (α1, θˆ1, β1) = (1, 1, 0.1), (α2, θˆ2, β2) = (0.3, 10, 3)
and (α3, θˆ3, β3) = (0.5, 3, 5). CP 1 represents Google-type of CPs that are extensively accessed and
less sensitive to throughput. CP 2 represents Netflix-type of CPs that are more throughput-sensitive and
have high unconstrained throughput. CP 3 represents Skype-type of CPs that are extremely sensitive to
throughput and have medium unconstrained throughput.
Figure 3 illustrates the rates and the corresponding demands of the three CPs under a max-min fair
allocation mechanism. We vary the per capita capacity ν from 0 to 6, 000. We observe that when ν
increases from zero, the demand for Google-type content increases first, followed by the demand for
Skype-type content and, the demand for Netflix-type content being the last.
III. MONOPOLISTIC ISP ANALYSIS
In this section, we start with the scenario where the last-mile capacity is controlled by a single
monopolistic ISP I . We analyze the ISP’s strategy under which non-neutral service differentiation is
allowed, and the corresponding best responses of the CPs. We derive the equilibria of the system and
analyze the ISP’s impact on the system congestion and the welfare of the consumers and the ISP itself.
3Any α-proportional fair solution also satisfies Assumption 2.
Fig. 3. Throughput under max-min fair mechanism.
A. Non-Neutral Service Differentiation
We assume that the monopolistic last-mile ISP I has a capacity of µ. This ISP can be a retail residential
ISP, e.g. Comcast and Time Warner Cable, or a mobile operator, e.g. Verizon and AT&T. Regardless of
whether it is a wired or wireless provider, it serves as the last-mile service provider for the consumers.
We assume that the ISP is allowed to allocate a fraction κ ∈ [0, 1] of its capacity to serve premium CPs
and charge them at a rate c ∈ [0,∞) (dollar per unit traffic). For a wired ISP, κ can be interpreted as
the percentage of capacity deployed for private peering points that charge a fee of c per unit incoming
traffic and 1−κ can be interpreted as the percentage of capacity deployed for public peering points where
incoming traffic is charge-free. For a wireless ISP, κ can be interpreted as the percentage of capacity
devoted for the premium traffic that will be charged at a rate of c. The pair of parameters (κ, c) can also
be thought of a type of Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) [21], [23], where one ordinary and another premium
service class have capacities of (1−κ)µ and κµ and charge 0 and c respectively. In reality, content might
be delegated via content distribution networks (CDNs), e.g. Akamai, or backbone ISPs, e.g. Level3 is a
major tier-1 ISP that delivers Netflix traffic towards regional ISPs. Therefore, in practice, the charge c
might be imposed on the delivering ISP, e.g. Level3, and then be recouped from the CP, e.g. Netflix, by
its delivering ISP, e.g. Level3. Our model does not assume any form of the implementation.
We denote O and P as the two disjoint sets of CPs that join the ordinary and premium class respectively.
We denote vi as CP i’s per unit traffic revenue. This revenue can be generated by advertising for media
clients, e.g Google, or by selling products to online consumers, e.g. Amazon, or by providing services to
consumers, e.g. Netflix and e-banking. Our model does not assume how the revenue is generated either.
Each CP i’s utility function ui can be expressed as
ui(λi) =
{
viλi if i ∈ O,
viλi − cλi if i ∈ P .
(4)
We define IS = cλP as the ISP surplus (CP-side revenue) and denote Ψ as the per capita ISP surplus
defined as
Ψ =
IS
M
=
c
M
λP =
c
M
∑
i∈P
λi(θi) = c
∑
i∈P
αidi(θi)θi.
B. Content Provider’s Best Response
Given the ISP’s decision κ and c, each CP chooses whether to join the ordinary service class O or
the premium class P . We denote ρi as the per capita throughput over CP i’s user base, i.e. αiM users,
defined as
ρi(ν,N ) = di(θi(ν,N ))θi(ν,N ). (5)
Lemma 2: Given a fixed set O of CPs in the ordinary class and a fixed set P of CPs in the premium
class, a new CP i’s optimal strategy is to join the premium service class, if
(vi − c) ρi
(
κν,P ∪ {i}) ≥ vi ρi((1− κ)ν,O ∪ {i}). (6)
Moreover, when equality reaches, CP i obtains the same utility in both service classes.
Proof of Lemma 2: When joining the ordinary service class, the throughput of CP i is
λi(M, (1− κ)µ,O ∪ {i}) = αiMρi(M, (1− κ)µ,O ∪ {i})
= αiMρi((1− κ)ν,O ∪ {i}).
When joining the premium service class, the throughput is
λi(M,κµ,P ∪ {i}) = αiMρi(M,κµ,P ∪ {i})
= αiMρi(κν,P ∪ {i}).
Therefore, by Equation 4, CP i’s utility is
ui =
{
viαiMρi((1− κ)ν,O ∪ {i}) if i ∈ O,
(vi − c)αiMρi(κν,P ∪ {i}) if i ∈ P .
By comparing the utilities that can be obtained in the two service classes, we obtain the condition (6).
Lemma 2 states that a CP will join the premium service class if that results higher profit, which is
per-unit flow profit (vi − c for the premium class) multiplied by the per capita throughput ρi. The above
decision is clear for a CP only if all other CPs have already made their choices. To treat all CPs equally,
we model the decisions of all CPs as a simultaneous-move game as part of a two-stage game.
C. Two-Stage Strategic Game
We model the strategic behavior of the ISP and the CPs as a two-stage game, denoted as a quadruple
(M,µ,N , I ).
1) Players: The ISP I and the set of CPs N .
2) Strategies: ISP I chooses a strategy sI = (κ, c). Each CP i chooses a binary strategy of whether to
join the premium class. The CPs’ strategy profile can be written as sN = (O,P), where O∪P = N
and O ∩ P = ∅.
3) Rules: In the first stage, ISP I decides sI = (κ, c) and announces it to all the CPs. In the second stage,
all the CPs make their binary decisions simultaneously and reach a joint decision sN = (O,P).
4) Outcome: The set P of the CPs shares a capacity of κµ and the set O of the CPs shares a capacity
of (1 − κ)µ. Each CP i ∈ O gets a rate λi(M, (1 − κ)µ,O) and each CP j ∈ P gets a rate
λj(M,κµ,P).
5) Payoffs: Each CP i’s payoff is defined by the utility ui(λi) in Equation (4). The ISP’s payoff is the
revenue IS = cλP received from the premium class.
If we regard the set of CPs as a single player that chooses a strategy sN , our two-stage game can be
thought of a Stackelberg game [22]. In this game, the first-mover ISP can take all the best-responses of
the CPs into consideration and derive its optimal strategy sI using backward induction [18]. Given any
fixed strategy sI = (κ, c), the CPs derive their best strategies under a simultaneous-move game, denoted
as (M,µ,N , sI ). We denote sN (M,µ,N , sI ) = (O,P) as a strategy profile of the CPs under the game
(M,µ,N , sI ). Technically speaking, when κ = 0 or 1, there is only one service class. When κ = 0, we
define the trivial strategy profile as sN = (N , ∅); when κ = 1, although there is not a physical ordinary
class, we define the trivial strategy profile as sN = (O,N\O), with O = {i : vi ≤ c, i ∈ N} which
defines the set of ISPs that cannot afford to join the premium class. Based on Lemma 2, we can define
an equilibrium in the sense of a Nash or competitive equilibrium. To break a tie, we assume that a CP
always chooses to join the ordinary service class when both classes provide the same utility.
Definition 2: A strategy profile sN = (O,P) is a Nash equilibrium of a game (M,µ,N , sI ), if
vi − c
vi

≤ ρi
(
(1− κ)ν,O)
ρi
(
κν,P ∪ {i}) if i ∈ O,
>
ρi
(
(1− κ)ν,O ∪ {i})
ρi
(
κν,P) if i ∈ P .
(7)
D. Competitive Equilibrium
Notice that a CP’s joining decision to a service class might increase the congestion level and reduce
the throughput of flows of that service class; however, if the number of CPs in a service class is big, an
additional CP i’s effect will be marginal. Analogous to the pricing-taking assumption [18] in a competitive
market, we can make a throughput-taking assumption for the CPs as follows.
Assumption 3: Any CP i /∈ N makes an estimate ρ˜i(ν,N ) on its ex-post per capita throughput ρi(ν,N∪
{i}) in the decision-making under a competitive equilibrium.
Based on the above throughput-taking assumption, we can define a competitive equilibrium of the CPs
as follows.
Definition 3: A strategy profile sN = (O,P) is a competitive equilibrium of a game (M,µ,N , sI ), if
vi − c
vi

≤ ρi
(
(1− κ)ν,O)
ρ˜i
(
κν,P) if i ∈ O,
>
ρ˜i
(
(1− κ)ν,O)
ρi
(
κν,P) if i ∈ P .
(8)
The competitive equilibrium depends on how each CP i calculates ρ˜i = di(θ˜i)θ˜i, which boils down
to an estimation of the ex-post throughput θ˜i. This estimation depends on the rate allocation mechanism
being used. For example, under the max-min fair mechanism, CP i can expect an achievable throughput of
θN = max{θj : j ∈ N}. Thus, CP i can take this throughput as given and estimate that θ˜i = min{θˆi, θN}.
To perform numerical evaluations, we will focus on competitive equilibria for two reasons. First, because
the number of CPs in practice is big, the congestion-taking assumption is valid. Second, the common
knowledge assumption [18] for reaching Nash equilibria might be questionable, because CPs rarely know
the characteristics of all other CPs in practice. Nevertheless, most of our results apply for both equilibrium
definitions. In the rest of the paper, unless we specifically indicate an equilibrium to be Nash or competitive,
we use the term equilibrium to indicate both the Nash (Definition 2) and the competitive equilibrium
(Definition 3).
Theorem 3: If sN = (O,P) is an equilibrium of a game (M,µ,N , sI ), it is also a same type of
equilibrium (Nash or competitive) of a game (ξM, ξµ,N , sI ) for any ξ > 0.
Proof of Theorem 3: Under the same strategy sI = (κ, c), the new ordinary class (ξM, ξ(1−κ)µ,O) and
the new premium class (ξM, ξκµ,P) have the same per capita capacity (1− κ)ν and κν respectively as
before. By Lemma 1, the new system induces the same throughput θi as before. As a result, the solution
(O,P) will induce the same values of ρi and ρ˜i, which is an estimate on ρi based on θi. Therefore, both
sides of (7) and (8) do not change and the equilibrium conditions still hold.
Although a game (M,µ,N , sI ) might have multiple equilibria, we do not assume that it reaches a
particular equilibrium. However, to make equilibria under the same per capita capacity ν consistent, we
make the following assumption.
Assumption 4: If sN = (O,P) is a realized equilibrium of a game (M,µ,N , sI ), then it is also the
realized equilibrium of the linearly scaled game (ξM, ξµ,N , sI ) for any ξ > 0.
The above assumption implies that when the ISP scales its capacity µ linearly and smoothly with its
consumer size M , the CPs will not diverge abruptly into another equilibrium, if there exists any. For
the game (M,µ,N , sI ) with strategy sI = (κ, c) and equilibrium sN = (O,P), the per capita consumer
surplus Φ is a function of ν, defined as
Φ(M,µ,N , sI ) = Φ(ν,N , sI ) = Φ((1− κ)ν,O) + Φ(κν,P).
Under the above assumption, the per capita consumer and ISP surplus will remain the same in linearly
scaled games {(ξM, ξµ,N , sI ) : ξ > 0} in equilibrium.
Lemma 3: Under Assumption 4, the per capita consumer surplus Φ satisfies
Φ(ν,N , sI ) = Φ(ξM, ξµ,N , sI ), ∀ ξ > 0.
The above is true for the per capita ISP surplus Ψ as well.
Proof of Lemma 3: Given sI = (κ, c) and sN = (O,P), the per capita consumer surplus Φ in system
(M,µ,N ) is
Φ(M,µ,N , sI ) = Φ(M, (1− κ)µ,O) + Φ(M,κµ,P).
By Theorem 2, we can rewrite the above as
Φ(M,µ,N , sI ) = Φ((1− κ)ν,O) + Φ(κν,P).
By Assumption 4, we know that a linearly scaled system (ξM, ξµ,N ) under the same strategy sI will
induce the same equilibrium sN = (O,P). As a result, we have
Φ(ξM, ξµ,N , sI ) = Φ((1− κ)ν,O) + Φ(κν,P) ∀ξ > 0.
Since the right hand side of the above equations are the same, we can express Φ as a function of ν as
Φ(ν,N , sI ) = Φ(ξM, ξµ,N , sI ) ∀ξ > 0.
Since Ψ = c
∑
i∈P αiρi(ν,N ), under a scaled system where ν and P do not change, Ψ does not change
either.
E. Monopolistic ISP’s Strategy
In order to generate revenue, the ISP’s optimal strategy would encourage more CPs to join its premium
service class.
Theorem 4: In the game (M,µ,N , I ), for any 0 ≤ c < 1, strategy sI = (κ, c) is always dominated by
s1I = (1, c). If λP < min{µ,
∑
vi≥c λˆi}, sI is strictly dominated by s1I . sI = (κ, c) is also dominated by
s′I = (κ
′, c) with κ′ > κ, if equilibrium (O′,P ′) under s′I satisfies P ⊆ P ′.
Proof of Theorem 4: Under s1I = (1, c), only the premium service class is provided and CPs will join
the premium service class only if vi ≥ c. Therefore, the aggregate rate λ1P = min{µ,
∑
i∈Pc λˆi}, wherePc = {i : vi ≥ c}. When keeping the same c, P ⊆ Pc under any strategy sI . We have
λP = min{κµ,
∑
i∈P⊆Pc
λˆi} ≤ min{µ,
∑
i∈Pc
λˆi} = λ1P .
The above implies that the revenue cλP ≤ cλ1P . Therefore, sI is dominated by s1I . If λP < min{µ,
∑
i∈Pc λˆi},
λP < λ1P , and therefore sI is strictly dominated by s
1
I .
Similarly, for any κ′ > κ with P ⊆ P ′, we have
λP = min{κµ,
∑
i∈P⊆P ′
λˆi} ≤ min{κ′µ,
∑
i∈P ′
λˆi} = λP ′ .
Therefore, sI is also dominated by s′I .
When the monopoly ISP increases κ, it improves the condition in the premium service class and in a
new equilibrium, P ′ would attract more CPs to join than P . Theorem 4 states that the ISP would have
incentives to increase κ so as to maximize revenue. The effect of increasing κ is twofold: 1) more capacity
is allocated to the premium class for sale, and 2) the reduced capacity in the ordinary class makes more
ISPs switch to the premium class. As a result, one of the optimal strategies of the monopolistic ISP is to
always set κ = 1. This implies that, if allowed, the selfish ISP will only provide a charged service class
P without contributing any capacity for the ordinary class O. Suppose the ISP is allowed to set κ = 1,
we first study its optimal price c and its impact on the consumer and ISP surplus.
We use the demand function of Equation (3) and the max-min fair mechanism for our numerical
simulations. We study a scenario of 1000 CPs, whose αi, θˆi and vi are uniformly distributed within [0, 1]
and βi is uniformly distributed within [0, 10]. To satisfy all unconstrained throughput for the CPs, the per
capita capacity needs to be around ν = 250. Since throughput-sensitive applications, e.g. Skype, bring
more utility to consumers in reality, we consider the consumer utility φi that is uniformly distributed
within [0, βi] (the uniform distribution biases utility towards CPs with high throughput sensitivity while
introducing some randomness)4.
Fig. 4. Per capita surplus Ψ and Φ under κ = 1.
Figure 4 plots Ψ and Φ versus the ISP’s pricing strategy c under various per capita capacity ν ranging
from 20 to 200. We observe three pricing regimes.
1) When c is small, Ψ increases linearly, i.e. Ψ = cν. This happens when most of the CPs can afford
to join the service and the entire capacity is fully utilized, i.e. λP = µ, resulting a high level of
consumer surplus Φ.
2) When c is large, Ψ drops sharply. This happens when only a small set of CPs can afford to join
the service and the capacity is largely under-utilized, i.e. λP < µ, resulting a sharp drop in Φ
accordingly.
3) When ν is abundant, e.g. ν = 200, there exists a pricing region where Ψ increases sub-linearly and
Φ decreases. Consequently, the ISP’s optimal strategy ( c ≈ 0.45) could intentionally keep more
4We also used another setting of φi = U [0, U [0, 10]], that has the same scale but is independent of βis for all the experiments in Section
III and IV. All the results are similar with the current setting and are shown in the appendix.
Fig. 5. Per capita surplus Ψ and Φ under various strategies sI = (κ, c) versus per capita capacity ν.
CPs away from the (only) service class and under-utilizes the capacity, which hurts the consumer
surplus Φ.
As a result, the consumer surplus could be misaligned with a monopoly ISP’s revenue when the capacity
is abundant.
Figure 5 illustrates Ψ and Φ under various strategies sI = (κ, c) versus ν ranging up to 500, which
doubles the required capacity to serve all unconstrained throughput. For a fixed c in each column, we
identify three equilibrium regimes.
1) When ν is small, Ψ increases linearly and Φ increases accordingly. This happens when the premium
class capacity is fully utilized, i.e. λP = κµ.
2) When ν keeps increasing, Ψ starts to decrease and Φ increases at a much slower rate. This happens
when the premium class capacity is not fully utilized, i.e. λP < κµ, and more CPs move from P
to O.
3) When ν is large, Ψ drops to zero for small values of κ, where Φ is maximized. This happens when
P = ∅ and O’s capacity is abundant enough to serve all CPs’ unconstrained throughput. However,
if κ is big, e.g. κ = 0.9, it guarantees some revenue for the ISP, but reduces the consumer surplus
from its maximum.
Further, under a fixed ν, we observe that higher κ induces higher revenue for the ISP (Theorem 4), even
if that results an under-utilization of the premium class capacity and hurts the consumer surplus. When
comparing different prices c, we observe that larger values of c make the premium class becomes under-
utilized faster, because fewer CPs can afford to join the premium class when necessary. However, when
reaching the turning point where congestion starts to be relieved, κ plays a major role, under which Φ’s
rate of increase depends on how much percentage 1− κ of capacity is allocated to the ordinary class O.
Notice that only under the exceptional case where 1) the capacity is extremely scarce, and 2) CPs with
high values of vis also have high values of φis for consumer utility, the ISP’s optimal strategy of κ = 1
and large value of c might benefit the consumer surplus.
Under a fixed strategy sI , Φ(ν,N , sI ) is not strictly non-decreasing in ν compared to the result of
Theorem 2. The reason is that when ν varies, CPs might move between the service classes. In general,
when ν changes a small amount such that sN = (O,P) does not change, the monotonicity still holds;
however, when ν keeps increasing, CPs will move from P to O, upon which Φ might drop at the spot.
We characterize this discontinuity by the following metric.
sI = sup{Φ(ν1,N , sI )− Φ(ν2,N , sI ) : ν1 < ν2}. (9)
Notice that sI captures the largest vertical distance of a downward gap in the curve Φ(ν,N , sI ). From
Figure 5, we observe that when |N | is large, sI is quite small, which indicates the general trend of
increasing Φ with ν.
Regulatory Implications: In the monopolistic scenario, the ISP with fixed capacity µ will maximize
the percentage of capacity for a charged service class (κ) even if it is under-utilized. This implies that
the ISP has the incentive to degrade service quality or avoid network upgrades or investments for the
non-charged service class. To remedy this problem, the network neutrality principle should be imposed to
some extent to protect consumer surplus. In other words, the non-neutral service differentiation should be
limited, especially when the capacity µ is not scarce, by two means: 1) limit the percentage of capacity
devoted to a charged premium class5, i.e. κ cannot be too large, such that the CPs in the ordinary class
can obtain an appropriate amount of capacity, and 2) limit the charge c so that enough CPs would be able
to join the premium class. The bottom line is that capacity under-utilization should be avoided under any
case.
IV. OLIGOPOLISTIC ISP ANALYSIS
In the previous section, we concentrate on a monopolistic ISP I that has a capacity µ and uses a strategy
sI = (κ, c). In this section, we extend our model to a set I of oligopolistic ISPs, each I ∈ I of which has
a capacity µI and uses a strategy sI = (κI , cI ). We define µ =
∑
I∈I µI as the total system capacity, and
mI = MI/M and γI = µI/µ as the market share and capacity share of ISP I . Our oligopolistic models
have two major differences with the monopolistic model. First, since consumers connect to the Internet
via one of the ISPs, they might make strategic decisions on which ISP to subscribe to. We denote MI as
the consumer size of each ISP I ∈ I, where ∑I∈IMI equals the total consumer size M . Second, besides
maximizing the premium service revenue from the CPs, a more important objective of any ISP I ∈ I is
to maximize their market share mI of the consumers. This is what the last-mile ISPs can leverage on to
generate the CP-side of the revenue in the first place.
Similar to the monopolistic ISP game (M,µ,N , I ), we denote (M,µ,N , I) as the two-stage oligopolis-
tic ISP game, under which the set of ISPs I choose their strategies sI = {sI : I ∈ I} simultaneously in the
first stage, and then the set of CPs N and the M consumers make their strategic decisions simultaneously
in a second-stage game (M,µ,N , sI). In the second-stage game, we denote sM = {MI : I ∈ I} as the
consumers’ strategy that determines all ISPs’ market shares, and sN = {sIN = (OI ,PI ) : I ∈ I} as the
CPs’ strategy, where each sIN denotes the decision made at ISP I .
We denote ΦI as the per capita consumer surplus achieved at ISP I , defined as ΦI (MI , µI ,N , sI ) =
ΦI (νI ,N , sI ) = Φ((1 − κI )νI ,OI ) + Φ(κI νI ,PI ), where νI = µI/MI . We assume that consumers will
move towards the ISPs that provide higher per capita surplus as follows.
Assumption 5: Under any fixed strategy profile sI and sN , for any pair of ISPs I , J ∈ I, consumers
will move from I to J if ΦI < ΦJ . This process stops when ΦI = ΦI ∀I ∈ I for some system-wise per
capita consumer surplus ΦI .
Although consumers might not be totally elastic or/and accessible to all available ISPs in practice,
our assumption takes a macro perspective and assumes that if an ISP provides worse user-experience
5This was also suggested as a regulatory tool by an independent work of Shetty et. al. [23].
on average, there must exist some consumers who can and will move to other better ISPs. Based on
Assumption 5, we define the equilibrium of the second-stage game (M,µ,N , sI) as follows.
Definition 4: A strategy profile (sM , sN ) is an equilibrium of the multi-ISP game (M,µ,N , sI) if 1)
for any I ∈ I, sIN is an equilibrium of the single-ISP game (MI , µI ,N , sI ), and 2) ΦI = ΦJ for any
I , J ∈ I.
A. Duopolistic ISP Game
We first study a two-ISP game with I = {I , J}. Before that, we formally define a Public Option ISP
as follows.
Definition 5: A Public Option ISP PO is an ISP that uses a fixed strategy sPO = (0, 0) and does not
divide its capacity or charge the CPs.
Fig. 6. A two-ISPs model.
We assume that ISP J is a Public Option ISP. Figure 6 illustrates an example of the above duopolistic
model, where both ISPs have the same amount of capacity, the CPs choose a service class at ISP I and
the consumers move between the ISPs. The above setting of the duopolistic game applies for two real
scenarios. First, it models the competition between two ISPs, where one of them is actively a Public
Option ISP and the other actively manages a non-neutral service differentiation. Second, it also models a
situation where a single ISP owns the entire last-mile capacity µ; however, by regulation [3], it is required
to lease its capacity to other service providers that do not own the physical line. The leasing ISP might
be technologically limited from providing service differentiation on the leased capacity, but actually have
customers in the region. For both scenarios, we will answer 1) whether the non-neutral ISP could obtain
substantial advantages over the neutral Public Option ISP (or whether the Public Option could survive
under competition), and 2) how the competition is going to impact the consumer surplus.
We study the same set of 1000 CPs as in the previous section. We further assume that µI = µJ = µ/2
in our numerical example. We take the same route to numerically evaluate the competitive equilibria of
the CPs under κI = 1.
Figure 7 plots ISP I ’s market share mI , per capita surplus ΨI , defined as ΨI = cMλPI , and Φ versus
ISP I ’s charge cI . By the same reasons as before, the revenue of I increases linearly when its capacity
is fully utilized, i.e. λPI = κIµI . However, we observe three differences: 1) after λPI drops below κIµI ,
ΨI drops to zero much steeper than before, 2) ΦI does not drop down to zero when cI increases to 1,
and 3) the maximum ΨI is lower in the case of ν = 200 than in the case of ν = 150, which means that
under κI = 1, capacity expansion could reduce ISP I ’s revenue from the CPs. All these observations can
be explained by checking at the market share of ISP I in the left sub-figure. The market share mI starts
to increase with cI until ISP I ’s capacity becomes under-utilized, i.e. λPI < κIµI . Afterwards, the market
share drops dramatically. This explains that under congestion, i.e. λPI = κIµI , by increasing cI , ISP I
restricts the number of CPs in its service class and maintains less congestion, which could result higher
Fig. 7. ISP I ’s market share mI and per capita surplus ΨI and per capita consumer surplus Φ under κ = 1.
Fig. 8. Per capita surplus Ψ, Φ and market share mI under various strategies sI = (κ, c) vs. per capita capacity ν.
consumer surplus, and therefore, attract more consumers from ISP J . After λPI drops below κIµI , further
increase of cI reduces the number of CPs in the service as well as the total throughput. This reduces
consumer surplus, and therefore, consumers start to depart from ISP I to J . When cI reaches 1, no CP
survives in I ’s service class and all consumers move to ISP J , which guarantees a non-zero consumer
surplus in equilibrium.
Parallel to Figure 5, Figure 8 illustrates the per capita surplus ΨI , Φ and ISP I ’s market share mI under
various strategies sI versus ν ranging up to 500. Compared to the monopolistic case, we observe two
differences in ΨI and Φ: 1) under any strategy sI , ISP I ’s revenue drops sharply to zero after reaching
a maximum point where λPI drops below κIµI , and 2) the increase of consumer surplus does not get
affected by ISP I’s strategy too much. By observing the market share of ISP I , we identify two capacity
regimes. First, when ν is extremely scarce, the differential pricing slightly benefits the consumer; and
therefore, ISP I can obtain a slightly larger percentage of the market 6. Second, when the per capita
capacity ν is abundant, ISP I obtains at most an equal share of the market if it uses a small value of κ.
Under this case, the capacity under O can support half of the population’s unconstrained throughput and
in fact, the premium class is empty, i.e. P = ∅. As a result, ISP I follows the Public Option ISP by using
some kind of neutral policy (small κ) and maximizes the consumer surplus.
Theorem 5: In the duopolistic game (M,µ,N , I), where an ISP J is a Public Option, i.e. sJ = (0, 0),
if sI maximizes MI under an equilibrium (sM , sN ), then the per capita consumer surplus ΦI is also
maximized under that equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 5: For any strategy s′I 6= sI , we have two cases to analyze. First, if M ′I = MI , then
M ′J = M −M ′I = M −MI = MJ . Given the same market share for the public option ISP, it induces the
same per capita consumer surplus Φ′J = ΦJ . In equilibrium, we have Φ
′
I = Φ
′
J = ΦJ = ΦI . Second, if
M ′I < MI , then M
′
J = M −M ′I > M −MI = MJ . Given a larger market share for the public option ISP,
the per capita capacity reduces, i.e. ν ′J < νJ . By Theorem 2, the public option will not induce a larger
per capita consumer surplus, i.e. Φ′J ≤ ΦJ . Thus, we have Φ′I = Φ′J ≤ ΦJ = ΦI in equilibrium.
Theorem 5 implies that the existence of a Public Option ISP is superior to a network neutral situation,
where sI = (0, 0). This is because given the freedom of choosing an optimal sI to maximize market
share, ISP I ’s strategy will induce a maximum consumer surplus under sJ = (0, 0).
Based on our results, we answer the previously raised two questions: 1) The non-neutral ISP cannot win
substantially over the Public Option ISP, which can still be profitable under the competition, confirming
the independent findings from [12]. 2) Regardless of the capacity size, the competition induces higher
consumer surplus in equilibrium than under network neutral regulations. The strategic ISP could obtain
slightly over 50% of the market; however, if it differentiates services in the way that hurts consumer
surplus, its market share will drop sharply.
Regulatory Implications: In the duopolistic scenario with one of the ISPs being a Public Option,
contrary to the monopolistic case, the non-neutral strategy sI is always aligned with the consumer surplus
(Theorem 5). This result shows an interesting alternative to remedy the network neutrality issue under
a monopolistic market. Instead of enforcing the ISP to follow network neutrality, the government (or a
private organization, since we independently verify it can be profitable) can provide the consumers with
a Public Option ISP that is neutral to all CPs. Given such a neutral entity in the market, consumers will
move to their public option if it provides higher consumer surplus than the non-neutral ISP that uses
differential pricing to the CPs. Meanwhile, in order to maximize its market share, the non-neutral ISP
will adapt its strategy to maximize consumer surplus. In conclusion, the introduction of a Public Option
ISP is superior to network neutral regulations under a monopolistic market, since its existence aligns the
non-neutral ISP’s selfish interest with the consumer surplus.
B. Oligopolistic ISP Competition Game
After analyzing the duopolistic game between a non-neutral and a Public Option ISP, we further consider
a deregulated market under which all ISPs make non-neutral strategies. We consider a multi-ISP game
6Notice that this is because by limiting the number of CPs in the premium class, the proportion of throughput-sensitive traffic is larger,
which gives higher utility to consumers.
under which each ISP I chooses a strategy sI to maximize its market share mI .
We first consider a homogenous strategy s = (κ, c), which can be a preferred or regulated strategy,
used by all ISPs.
Lemma 4: If sI = {sI = s : I ∈ I} for some strategy s = (κ, c), then {mI = γI , sIN = sN (M,µ,N , s) :
I ∈ I} is an equilibrium of the game (M, ν,N , s).
Lemma 4 shows a symmetric equilibrium where market share mI is proportional to capacity µI . It
implies that ISPs will have incentives to invest and expend capacity so as to obtain a larger market share.
This equilibrium could be reached when ISPs simply mimic one another’s strategy. A further question
is whether the competition of market share among the ISPs would induce equilibria where consumer
surplus is high. We denote s−I as the strategy profile of the ISPs other than ISP I . Similar to the
definition of sI in Equation (9), we define δsI = sup{m1 − m2 : Φ(ν1,N , sI ) ≤ Φ(ν2,N , sI )} and
s−I = max{sJ : J ∈ I\{I }}.
Proof of Lemma 4: When MI = γIM and sI = s for all I ∈ I, the single-ISP game (MI , µI ,N , s) is
a linearly scaled game of (M,µ,N , s). By Theorem 3, we know that
sIN = sN (M,µ,N , s) = sN (MI , µI ,N , sI ), ∀ I ∈ I.
By Lemma 3, we know that
ΦI = Φ(MI , µI ,N , sI ) = Φ(M,µ,N , s), ∀ I ∈ I.
The above satisfies the two conditions of an equilibrium in Definition 4 and concludes the proof.
Theorem 6: Under any fixed strategy profile s−I , if I ’s strategy sI is a best-response to s−I that
maximizes its market share mI in the game (M,µ,N , sI), then sI is a s−I -best-response for the per
capita consumer surplus ΦI , i.e.
ΦI ≥ Φ′I − s−I , ∀s′I 6= sI .
Moreover, if sI is a best-response that maximizes consumer surplus ΦI in the game (M,µ,N , sI), then
sI is a δsI -best-response for the market share mI , i.e.
mI ≥ m′I − δsI , ∀s′I 6= sI .
Proof of Theorem 6: If sI maximizes the market share MI , for any strategy s′I 6= sI , we have M ′I ≤MI .
Therefore, there exist an ISP J 6= I such that M ′J ≥ MJ . This implies ν ′J ≤ νJ . By the definition of sJ
in Equation (9), we have Φ′J − ΦJ ≤ sJ , or equivalently ΦJ ≥ Φ′J − sJ . Thus,
ΦI = ΦJ ≥ Φ′J − sJ = Φ′I − sJ ≥ Φ′I − s−I .
If sI maximizes the consumer surplus ΦI , for any strategy s′I 6= sI , we have Φ′I ≤ ΦI . By the definition
of δsI , we have m
′
I −mI ≤ δsI , or equivalently mI ≥ m′I − δsI .
Theorem 6 states that, given the fixed strategies of all other ISPs, an ISP’s best-responses to maximize
its market share and to maximize the consumer surplus are closely aligned. Parallel to Theorem 5, it
shows that an ISP’s selfish interest is, although not perfectly, aligned with the consumer surplus under
competition. Technically, the s−I imperfection is due to the discontinuity of Φ(ν,N , sI ) in ν. When s−I
approaches zero, Φ will be non-decreasing mostly and the objectives of maximizing market share and
maximizing consumer surplus will converge.
Definition 6: A strategy profile sI = {sI : I ∈ I} is a market share Nash equilibrium of the game
(M,µ, sN , I) if for any I ∈ I and any strategy s′I 6= sI , the market share mI satisfies mI (s′I , s−I) ≤
mI (sI , s−I). Similarly, sI is a consumer surplus Nash equilibrium of the game (M,µ, sN , I) if for any
I ∈ I and any strategy s′I 6= sI , the consumer surplus ΦI satisfies ΦI(s′I , s−I) ≤ ΦI(sI , s−I).
Corollary 1: If sI is a market shares Nash equilibrium of the oligopolistic game (M,µ,N , I), then
it is also a consumer surplus sI -Nash equilibrium, where sI = max{sI : I ∈ I}. Conversely, if
sI is a consumer surplus Nash equilibrium, then it is also a market share δsI -Nash equilibrium, where
δsI = max{δsI : I ∈ I}.
Proof of Corollary 1: If sI is a market share Nash equilibrium, by definition, each sI is a market share
best response of s−I . Therefore, by Theorem 6, we have
ΦI ≥ Φ′I − s−I ≥ Φ′I − sI , ∀s′I 6= sI ,
which concludes that sI is a consumer surplus sI -Nash equilibrium. If sI is a consumer surplus Nash
equilibrium, by definition, each sI is a consumer surplus best response of s−I . Therefore, by Theorem 6,
we have
mI ≥ m′I − δsI ≥ m′I − δsI , ∀s′I 6= sI ,
which concludes that sI is a market share δsI -Nash equilibrium.
As a direct consequence of Theorem 6, Corollary 1 addresses that the objectives of maximizing market
share and maximizing consumer surplus are also closely aligned under Nash equilibria of the oligopolistic
game (M,µ,N , I).
Regulatory Implications: In the oligopolistic scenario, all ISPs’ optimal strategies are closely aligned
with the consumer surplus. Even some ISPs use sub-optimal decisions, any remaining ISPs’ optimal
strategy would still nearly maximize the system consumer surplus (Theorem 6). This alignment with
consumer surplus also sustains under Nash equilibria of the multi-ISP competition game (Corollary 1).
In conclusion, network neutral regulations are not needed or should not be imposed under a competition
market; otherwise, the achieved consumer surplus would be sub-optimal compared to what can be achieved
in the efficient Nash equilibria. However, regulations should enforce the ISPs to be transparent in the sense
that each ISP’s capacity and strategy should be common knowledge to all ISPs. This would help the market
converge to an efficient equilibrium more easily.
V. RELATED WORK
Despite of its short history, plenty of work on network neutrality can be found in computer science
[11], [20], [6], [12], [23], [17], economics [8], [15], and law [25], [24] literature.
From an economics perspective, Sidak [24] looked at the network neutrality regulation from consumer
welfare’s point of view and argued that differential pricing is essential to the maximization of welfare.
We also focus on the consumer welfare and seek the conditions under which ISPs’ strategy would be
aligned with consumer welfare. Choi et al. [8] analyzed the effect of neutral regulations on ISPs’ investment
incentive and found that capacity expansion decreases the sale price of the premium service. This coincides
with our finding under the monopolistic scenario; however, under oligopolistic competitions, we find that
ISPs do have incentives to increase capacity so as to maximize market share.
From an engineering perspective, Dhamdhere et al. [12] took a profitability perspective and concluded
that the ISPs can still be profitable without violating network neutrality. This supports our proposal of a
Public Option ISP that can be implemented and sustained by either a government or a private organization.
Crowcroft [11] reviewed the technical aspects of network neutrality and concluded that “perfect” network
neutrality has never been and should not be engineered. We share the same view that under competition,
network neutrality regulation is not necessary; while, under a monopolistic market, a non-regulatory
alternative can be a Public Option ISP that incentivizes the existing ISP to maximize consumer surplus.
From a modeling point of view, Musacchio et al. [20] considered advertising CPs and also used a
two-stage model under which ISPs move first. Their focus was primarily on a monopolistic ISP. Caron
et al. [6] modeled differentiated pricing for two application type. Our model captures more applications
types with parameters of popularity (αi), maximum throughput (θˆi) and sensitivity to the throughput (βi).
Another departure in our approach from previous analyses is the way we model traffic and congestion in
the network. Traditionally, the classical M/M/1 formula for delay has been used to abstract out traffic and
congestion [8] in economic analyses. Our view is that a more appropriate approach is to more faithfully
model closed loop protocols like TCP that carry most of the traffic on the Internet. Shetty et al. [23] used
a similar PMP-like two-class service differentiations and considered capacity planning, regulation as well
as differentiated pricing to consumers. Our differentiated pricing focuses on the CP-side, where the CPs
choose service classes and consumers choose ISPs.
From a regulatory aspect, Wu [25] surveyed the discriminatory practices, e.g. selectively dropping
packets, of broadband and cable operators and proposed solutions to manage bandwidth and police ISPs
so as to avoid discrimination. Shetty et al. [23] proposed a simple regulatory tool to restrict the percentage
of capacity the ISPs dedicate to a premium service class. Economides et al. [13] compared various
regulations for quality of service, price discrimination and exclusive contracts, and drew conclusions on
desirable regulation regimes. Ma et al. [17] considered the ISP settlement aspect and advocated the use of
Shapley value as profit-sharing mechanism to encourage ISPs to maximize social welfare. Our proposal of
a Public Option ISP, on the other hand, is an non-regulatory alternative to the network neutral regulations.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In a monopolistic market, the ISP’s selfish non-neutral strategy hurts consumer surplus. Although
network neutral regulation can improve consumer surplus under that case, we find a better non-regulatory
alternative which is to introduce a Public Option ISP. The existence of a Public Option ISP incentivizes
the existing ISP’s strategy to be aligned with consumer surplus, and achieve higher consumer surplus
than that under network neutral regulations. In an oligopolistic competition, market force influences ISPs’
non-neutral strategies to be aligned with consumer surplus and ISPs will get market shares proportional
to their capacities. Under this case, the existence of a Public Option ISP would be sub-optimal compared
to the efficient Nash equilibria; however, its damage is very limited because the Public Option ISP would
be the only one that uses a sub-optimal strategy, where all other ISPs can adapt to optimal strategies and
more consumers will move from the Public Option to better and non-neutral ISPs. Of course, there is no
reason why the Public Option ISP cannot perform the price discrimination that aligns with the consumer
surplus, which induces an efficient Nash equilibrium in theory. However, implementing a neutral public
option will avoid mistakes or accidental “collusion” with the existing ISPs in the market. In contrast, if
network neutral regulation is enforced, all ISPs will have to perform an neutral but inefficient strategy,
which could reduce the consumer surplus substantially.
Theoretically speaking, the existence of a Public Option ISP will be effective if µPO > 0, regardless
how large its capacity is. This is because, in the idealized game model, we assume that an ISP’s sole
objective is to maximize its market share. In practice, ISPs will trade off its market share with potential
revenue from the CPs, which depends on the characteristics of the CPs, e.g. their profit margin and
throughput sensitivity, and the condition of the system, e.g. the available capacity and congestion level.
Moveover, ISPs might be able to use the CP-side revenue to subsidize the service fees for consumers so
as to increase market share.
We envision that the Public Option should be implemented as the safety net, or the last/back-up
choice, for the consumers if the existing commercial ISPs’ strategy hurt consumer surplus. The more
ISPs competing in a market, the less the market needs a public option and the less capacity we need to
deploy for the Public Option ISP to be effective. In the most hostile case where only one monopolistic ISP
exists in the market, a Public Option ISP could be effective as long as it has a capacity that is larger than
the percentage of consumers that the monopoly cannot afford to lose. For example, if 10% of the market
share is critical for the monopoly, implementing 10% of its capacity would be able to at least “steal”
10% of consumers from the monopoly if it follows a network neutral strategy. If the monopoly applies
a worse than neutral strategy for consumer surplus, it will lose even more. In that sense, although 10%
of the capacity will not be operating optimally, its existence incentivizes the remaining 90% maximizing
for consumer surplus, which could result in much better consumer surplus than requiring the monopoly
to follow network neutral regulations.
Summarizing, we believe our paper sheds new light on and informs the continuing debate on the role
of regulation on the Internet and our introduction of the Public Option ISP is an important contribution.
REFERENCES
[1] FCC Acts to Preserve Internet Freedom and Openness. News Release(12/21/10). http://www.fcc.gov/Daily Releases/Daily Business/
2010/db1221/DOC-303745A1.pdf.
[2] Google corporate website. http://www.google.com/corporate/tech.html.
[3] Local Loop Unbundling. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local-loop unbundling.
[4] Netflix technology blog. http://techblog.netflix.com/2011/01/netflix-performance-on-top-isp-networks.html.
[5] M. Campbell and J. Browning. Apple, Google asked to pay up as mobile operators face data flood. Bloomberg News, December 7
2010.
[6] S. Caron, G. Kesidis, and E. Altman. Application neutrality and a paradox of side payments. Proceedings of the Re-Architecting the
Internet Workshop (ACM ReARCH ’10), November 2010.
[7] D. M. Chiu and R. Jain. Analysis of the increase and decrease algorithms for congestion avoidance in computer networks. Computer
Networks and ISDN Systems, 17(1).
[8] J. P. Choi and B.-C. Kim. Net neutrality and investment incentives. The Rand Journal of Economics, 41(3):446–471, Autumn 2010.
[9] D. Clark. The design philosophy of the DARPA Internet protocols. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 18(4), August
1988.
[10] C. Courcoubetis and R. Weber. Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling. John Wiley & Sons Ltd.,
2003.
[11] J. Crowcroft. Net neutrality: the technical side of the debate: a white paper. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 37(1),
January 2007.
[12] A. Dhamdhere and C. Dovrolis. Can ISPs be profitable without violating network neutrality? Proceedings of 2008 ACM Network
Economics (NetEcon), August 2008.
[13] N. Economides and J. Tag. Network neutrality and network management regulation: Quality of service, price discrimination, and
exclusive contracts. Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet. Ed. Ian Brown. London: Edward Elgar, 2012.
[14] P. Faratin, D. Clark, P. Gilmore, S. Bauer, A. Berger, and W. Lehr. Complexity of Internet interconnections: Technology, incentives
and implications for policy. The 35th Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy (TPRC), 2007.
[15] B. Hermalin and M. L. Katz. The economics of product-line restrictions with an application to the network neutrality debate. Information
Economics and Policy, 19(2):215–248, June 2007.
[16] C. Labovitz, D. McPherson, S. Iekel-Johnson, J. Oberheide, and F. Jahanian. Internet inter-domain traffic. In Proceedings of the ACM
SigComm, New Delhi, India, 2010.
[17] R. T. B. Ma, D. Chiu, J. C. Lui, V. Misra, and D. Rubenstein. Internet Economics: The use of Shapley value for ISP settlement.
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 18(3), June 2010.
[18] A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green. Microeconomic theory. Oxford University Press, 1995.
[19] J. Mo and J. Walrand. Fair end-to-end window-based congestion control. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 8(5), October 2000.
[20] J. Musacchio, G. Schwartz, and J. Walrand. Network neutrality and provider investment incentives. Asilomar Conference, pages
1437–1444, November 2007.
[21] A. Odlyzko. Paris metro pricing for the Internet. Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’99), pages 140–147,
1999.
[22] M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A course in game theory. The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994.
[23] N. Shetty, G. Schwartz, and J. Walrand. Internet QoS and regulations. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 18(6), December 2010.
[24] J. G. Sidak. A consumer-welfare approach to network neutrality regulation of the Internet. Journal of Competition Law and Economics,
2(3):349–474, September 2006.
[25] T. Wu. Network neutrality, broadband discrimination. Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 141, 2005.
APPENDIX
We also perform another set of experiments of the same set of 1000 CPs used in our experiments in
Section III and IV. The only difference is that the parameter φi has a distribution φi = U [0, U [0, 10]], which
is independent of βi. Figure 9 and 10 illustrate the consumer surplus under κ = 1 and various strategies
of the ISP respectively. Since the characteristics of the CPs are the same as our previous experiments, the
CPs’ decision and the ISP’s revenues are the same as before.
Fig. 9. Per capita surplus Φ under κ = 1.
Fig. 10. Φ under various strategies sI = (κ, c) versus per capita capacity ν.
Figure 11 and 12 show the results that are parallel to figure 7 and 8. We still find the same observations
as in our previous experiments.
Fig. 11. ISP I ’s market share mI and per capita surplus ΨI and per capita consumer surplus Φ under κ = 1.
Fig. 12. ISP I ’s market share mI and per capita surplus ΨI and per capita consumer surplus Φ under κ = 1.
